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Geoffrey Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
Room 332
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

Utah v. Vijil, No, 20111

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant, Daniel Vijil wishes to advise the Court of supplemental authority
which is pertinent to this action.
The appellant advised the Court, by a letter dated June 25, 1985
(photocopy attached), of a decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court, State of
New Mexico ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Jojola (1983), 99 N.M.
500, 660 P.2d 590, which is addressed to the issue of state subject matter
jurisdiction in a reservation based paternity and support action. The
appellant has now learned that this decision was brought upon on appeal before
the U.S. Supreme Court (No. 82-2049). The Motion To Dismiss (photocopy
attached) filed by the State of. New Mexico indicates that the appeal had become moot due to the amendment of state regulations which now defer to tribal
jurisdiction. Whatever weight is accorded the Jojola decision should be
determined in reference to these amendments.
Thank you.

Yours ^sincerely,

Attorney at Law
SB:sb
xc

Geoffrey Butler, Clerk
13 February 1986
Page 2

cc:

Mark Wainwright, Esq.
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Herb Yazzie, Esq.
NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Post Office Drawer 2010
Window Rock, Arizona 86515
Bruce Halliday, Esq.
San Juan County Courthouse
Monticello, Utah 84535

IN THE
W4y*£»i*. *. *****

W*

^iMMY ANDREW JOKJLAT
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW MEXiCO. EX REL ,
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Appellee
ON APPEAL FROM THE S U ? R Z J 2 COUR1]
Of THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
MCT.ON OF APPELLEE TO DISMISS
** *** *' * s

Attorney General of New Mexico
Assistant Attorney General
Santa re i\ew Ivl j \ co S^SC-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1)

Whether actions and events subsequent to the New Mexico
Supreme Court decision have rendered moot the question
of which forum should determine paternity and set a leve2
of child support.

(2)

Whether the question of who must reimburse the Human
Sendees Department for expenditures on behalf of the
dependent minor child or in which court suit must be
brought is ripe for review prior to a determination of
paternity, and if so, whether that question should be
addressed by this Court prior to its being addressed by
the New Mexico Supreme Court.

PAirriEThe parties to the proceedings are identified in the caption
of this case.
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!t. R. 16
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l.C. § 6 5 1 , et seq.t (Aug. 14, 1935,
.531, Title IV, §451, as added
an. 4, 1975, Pub.L. 97-35, Title
'XIII, §2332(a), 95 Stat. 861)
Records Act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
14-3-1, etseq.. (1978)
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The appellee State of New Mexico, ex rel Human Services
Department (hereinafter Department) respectfully moves the
Court under Rule 16 to dismiss this appeal because there is no
basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2), and because
events subsequent to the New Mexico Supreme Court decision
have rendered this case moot. In addition the nonjuiisdictional
questions appellant Jimmy Jojola (hereinafter Jojola) seeks to
raise are premature. 1

7TVTTTTTTTTTTTT2T

Rules Act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
14-4-1, et seq.t (1978)
Assistance Act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
27-2-1, etseq., (1978)
>tat. Ann. §27-2-27 (1978)
>tat. Ann. §27-2-28 (1978)
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R AUTHORITIES
iuman Services Dept. Program Manual,
icome Support Division, Vol. Ill,
' 2 9 , 548, 559.1, 569.2, 574

Because of subsequent events the questions which Jojola
seeks to present do not accurately state the questions before
this Court. The questions now presented by this appeal are:
(1) Whether actions and events subsequent to the New
Mexico Supreme Court decision have rendered moot
the question of which forum should determine paternity
and set a level of child support.
(2) Whether the question of who must reimburse the
Human Services Department for expenditures on behalf
of the dependent minor child or in which court suit

3,8
In January of 1983, a new administration took office in New Mexico
and began instituting substantial policy changes in the state's relationship
to Indian Tribes in New Mexico. These changes necessarily occurred after
the appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court was briefed and argued in
1982. An analysis of the state's position on domestic relations matters
involving Indians was begun following the state Supreme Court's "decision.
The determination was made to defer to Tribal sovereignty in matters
such as those presented by this appeal. The actions of the Department
in developing new manual policy followed promptly. It was decided that
Mr. Jojola be given the benefit of the new policy while the manual revision
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must be brought is ripe for review prior to a determination of paternity, and if so, whether that question
should be addressed by this Court prior to its being
addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
following additional facts should be added to those
nted in appellant's Jurisdictional Statement:2
On July 1, 1983, the Department issued a new formal
policy governing the procedure to be followed in all
cases seeking to establish paternity and set levels of
child support where the child, mother and putative
father are all Indians residing on the reservation. The
new policy recognizes the right of the Indian people
on a reservation to make their own determination of
paternity and to set levels of child support. It further
states the Department's policy will be to assist the
mother of the dependent child in tribal court to establish paternity. See Appendix A. 3

jponsibility to pursue paternity and child support obligations is
ted to the state by Subchapter IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42
. §651, et seq. (Aug. 14,1935, c.531, Title IV, §451, as added Jan. 4,
Pub.L. 93-647, §101(a), 88 Stat. 2351, and amended Aug. 13,
Pub.L. 97-35, Title XXIII, 12332(a), 95 Stat. 861). The state has
ated the Department to fulfill these responsibilities by Section
7 and 27-2-28, N.M.S.A. 1978. These sections are set forth in full
>endix E.
i additional actions by the Department changing procedures and
and obtaining dismissal of the original action in state court are
rly to be considered by this Court. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S.

3
2.

On or about June 13, 1983,DyanaAbeita, the mother
of the dependent minor child, filed a paternity and child
support action on behalf of the child in Isleta Tribal
Court. The Department's attorney represents her in this
action. See Appendix B.

3.

The Department filed a motion to dismiss its petition
in the District Court of the State of New Mexico on
June 13, 1983, on the grounds that the paternity issue
would be pursued in the Tribal Court of Isleta. See
Appendix C. On June 29, 1983, this motion was granted
over the objection of Jojola, and the petition to determine paternity and set child support was dismissed
without prejudice. See Appendix D.

ARGUMENT
L
THIS CASE IS MOOT BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT
HAS ISSUED A FORMAL POLICY REQUIRING THAT
PATERNITY PETITIONS SUCH AS THE ONE IN
THIS CASE BE FILED IN TRIBAL COURT.
The Department has issued a formal policy statement which
details the procedures to be followed in all cases similar to
the one presented by this appeal. 4 The policy statement
The policy statement has been codified as Section 529, Case Application
and Referral Procedures of the Department's Program Manual, Income
Support Division, Volume III, Child Support Enforcement Program, and is
reproduced in full and attached as Appendix A. The policy statement is
repeated verbatim as Section 548 (Case Processing—Establishment of a
Support Obligation), Section 559.1 (Case Processing—Establishment of
Paternity), Section 569*2 (Case Processing—Enforcement), and Section

4
s that in all such cases, in which the mother, putative
r, and child are Indians who reside on the reservation,
>atemity petition shall be filed in the Tribal Court of
etent jurisdiction. This type of formal policy statement
nes part of the organic law of the State of New Mexico.
Department is bound by the manual provision, which is
ced by the courts as the law of the state. See Hillman v.
h and Social Services Department, 92 N.M. 480, 590 P.2d
It. App. 1979).
rmal changes of a Department's policy go far beyond the
cessation of challenged activity by the defendants in
d States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953),
\ the Court was concerned that the defendants could
return to their old ways. For the state to return to its
M ways would require the same elaborate policy and manivisions as have just transpired in instituting the changes
I in footnote 4, supra. Formal policy statements are
lal controls which the agency imposes on its own operaand exercise of power. Federal courts have recognized
similar statements by federal agencies have the force of
°ickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107,
(D.C. Cir. 1974), or create binding law, as the court
in Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 135,
7
.2d 329 (1952). This type of change in law, applicable
e case at bar and to all future cases, obviates the need
i Article III court to resolve the issues raised by the prior
aversy.
i promulgation of this policy renders this case moot beit no longer presents a justiciable case or controversy.

manual revisions are filed with the Records Center pursuant to the
Records Act, Section 14-3-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1978, and State

5
The Department has substantially adopted the position urged
by Jojola, and the parties are in agreement on the issue presented for adjudication. A ruling from the Supreme Court of
the United States now could not give Jojola any relief that he
does not already have from the state. Consequently a decision
by this Court would be merely advisory. As the Court has
repeatedly noted, the Constitution of the United States limits
the federal courts to adjudication of cases and controversies
and bars advisory opinions. U.S. CONST. arLJII, §2; Lmery_
Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306, n.3 (1964).
The facts presented by this appeal are clearly encompassed
by the new policy statement's provisions. Pursuant to the
established •policy, the Department is pursuing its remedies in
Tribal Court where the parties are all Indians residing within the
reservation. Mr. Jojola, Ms. Abeita and her son, Jonathan
Abeita, are all enrolled members of the Isleta Tribe and reside
on the Isleta reservation. Jurisdictional Statement, p. 14.
At the time the notice of appeal was filed in this case, a live
controversy affecting the rights of Jojola existed. Since that
time, however, the Department codified its policy decision to
defer to Indian Tribal sovereignty in paternity determinations
such as presented here. The controversy that was present when
the case was initiated no longer exists and because the
controversy must continue at the appellate or certiorari review
stage, this case is now moot. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125
(1973).
Where changes have occurred such as here, this Court must
review the decision below in light of the law "as it npw stands,
not as it stood when the judgment below was entered."
Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414
(1972); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). The promulgation of a formal manual revision by the Department extends the

6
ction of the policy not only to Jojola but to all similarly
ted persons.

7

ni.
ANY DETERMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PAST CHILD SUPPORT
IS PREMATURE AND NOT RIPE FOR DECISION.

n
THE DEPARTMENT HAS SOUGHT AND OBTAINED A
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION IN STATE DISTRICT COURT
THEREBY MAKING THIS APPEAL MOOT.
i June 13, 1983, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss
case in the District Court of New Mexico. This motion was
ted on June 29, 1983. The Motion and the Order granting
i attached as Appendices C and D, respectively. The cause
remanded_to that court on March 31, 1983, by the New
LCO Supreme Court. In conformance with the new policy,
Department will no longer pursue this case in the state's
ts.
lie legality of the forum initially chosen by the Department
e basis of the lawsuit on appeal. The withdrawal or volundismissal of the legal action which is the basis of the appeal
f renders the appeal moot. Williams v. Simons, 355 U.S.
1957). There is no viable case or controversy of the kind neiry "to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of
" Hall v. Seals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). All the parties to
action are in agreement that this case should not be litid in state court and further that appropriate jurisdiction for
rminations of paternity lies in the Tribal Court. The dis;al by the state court leaves extant only the paternity
on of the mother in Tribal Court, and no justiciable conersy remains before this Court.

A noncustodial parent is liable to the Department in the
amount of the public assistance paid to persons to whom
that parent owes a duty of support. Section 27-2-28, N.M.S.A.
1978. No action can he for such repayments, however, until
a determination of paternity is made. Neither the state district
court nor the New Mexico Supreme Court has addressed the
merits of this case; therefore, no determination has been made
of the paternity of Jonathan Abeita. Until such time as the
paternity of the dependent child is determined, any attempt
to collect for sums expended by the Department and the
federal government on the child's behalf would be premature.
Any action against Jojola in any court to collect under the
repayment statute would not be ripe for decision at this time.
This Court should decline to decide this matter because it is
not yet ripe for review.
The "basic rationale [of the ripeness doctrine] is to prevent*
the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
Whether Jojola owes any obligation to repay the. sums expended under the Public Assistance Act (§§27-2-1, et seq.9
N.M.S.A. 1978) is premature absent an adjudication that he
is a "noncustodial parent [who] owes a duty of support.**
§27-2-28(A), N.M.S.A. 1978. A decision anticipating the De-

8
:s that the Isleta Tribal Court will determine that Jojola is
the dependent child's natural father. Until this issue is
Ived by the Tribal Court, the Department cannot know
t action it will take. 6
lie New Mexico Supreme Court did not address this
.er in its opinion and thereby implicity recognized that
question was premature. Moreover, because the New MexSupreme Court did not make any decision concerning
arsement actions, this Court should not assume jurison to decide such a question.

IV

9
Mexico statutes are valid which are allegedly repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties or federal statutes, this Court has no
justiciable case before it. Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253
(1944). See Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U.S.
210(1889).
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Appellee Department respectfully submits that
the questions upon which this cause depends are moot,
premature and so insubstantial as not to need further argument,
and Appellee Department respectfully moves the Court to
dismiss this^appeal.

JOJOLA CANNOT INVOKE 28 U.S.C. §1257(2)
WHERE THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT HAS NOT
LULED ON THE VALIDITY OF ANY NEW MEXICO STATUTE.

Respectfully submitted,
PAUL G. BARDACKE
Attorney General of New Mexico

jola contends that he comes within the appeals provisions
8 U.S.C. §1257 (2), by claiming that assumption of jurison by the New Mexico courts would be repugnant to the
;titution, treaties or laws of the United States. However,
VT
ew Mexico Supreme Court in deciding this case did not
.i the question of the validity of any New Mexico statutes
has Jojola raised any such issue in his jurisdictional stateL Until the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzes and
on the relevant statutes and treaties as applied to the
cular facts of an individual case or controversy, and rules
the federal statutes or treaties are invalid, or that New

WILLIAM G. WALKER
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 2348
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-2348
(505)827-4122
Counsel for Appellee

suant to Section 529, et at, of the Child Support Enforcement ProManual, any action to collect past Aid to Families with Dependent
ren (AFI)C) support must be approved by the Chief of the Child

July 12,1983
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

APPENDIX A

William G. Walker, hereby certify, pursuant to Rule 28 of
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, that on
12th day of July, 1983, I served the requisite number of
5S of the foregoing Motion To Dismiss by first class mail
ounsel of record for Appellant, Anthony F. Little, Indian
>io Legal Services, Inc., Star Route Box 38, Santa Ana
T9 Bernalillo, NM 87004.

WILLIAM G. WALKER
Assistant Attorney General

N.M. Human Services Dept. Program Manual, Income Support
Division, Vol. Ill
529 Deference to Indian Tribal Sovereignty
The Human Services Department recognizes the right of
Indian people residing on the reservation to resolve fundamental
issues in the area of domestic relations within the framework
of established principles of Indian Tribal sovereignty. As a
result, and notwithstanding the holding of the New Mexico
Supreme Court in State of New Mexico ex rel. Human Services
Department v. Jojola,
NM
, 660 P.2d 590 (1983),
CSEB will mot seek to establish the paternity in State Court
of putative Indian fathers who are amenable to suit in Tribal
Court where the mother, putative father, and child reside
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. In all such
cases, a paternity petition shall be brought in the name of the
natural mother, individually and as the natural guardian of the
child, in the Tribal Court of competent jurisdiction. If the
putative father is not amenable to suit in the Tribal Court or
the Tribal Court will not exercise personal or subject matter
jurisdiction, a paternity action may be brought in State court
only upon the prior written approval of the Chief of the Child
Support Enforcement Bureau and the General Counsel of the
Department.
No action to enforce an AFDC support obligation may be
brought against an absent Indian parent who resides on the
reservation without the prior written aprroval of the Chief of
the Child Support Enforcement Bureau and the General Counsel of the Department. No action to enforce a non-AFDC support obligation may be brought in State Court against an absent
Indian parent who resides on the reservation without the prior
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APPENDIX B

PETITIONER VERIFICATION

TRIBAL COURT OF ISLETA PUEBLO
^A ABEITA,

Petitioner^

Y JOJOLA,

Respondent.

PATERNITY PETITION
mes now petitioner, Dyana Abeita, and states unto the
t:
This petition is filed pursuant to Section 1-1-20 of the
Code authorization suits to determine paternity and child
Petitioner and respondent are members and residents of
>ueblo.
On October 13, 1979, petitioner gave birth to a child,
than Abeita, who is also a member and resident of this
io.
Respondent is the natural father of Jonathan Abeita
should be required to contribute to the support of the
r child according to his means.
Respondent has refused to provide for the support of
linor child.
fflEREFORE, petitioner prays the Court for:
An order determining the respondent to be the natural
\T of petitioner's child, Jonathan Abeita.
An order requiring respondent to support the child
rding to his means.
Such other relief as to the Court seems reasonable.
s/

Carrell Ray

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

)
)

COUNTY OF BERNALILLO)
Diana Abeita, being duly sworn states that she is the petitioner in the matter herein and that she has read the foregoing
petition and knows the contents thereof and that the same is
true of her own knowledge except as to matters herein stated
to be alleged on information and belief, and as to them she
believes them to be true.

s/ Dyana Abeita
Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
15 day of June, 1983.
LeRoy J. Moore
Notary Public-New Mexico
My Commission Expires 5/2/85

4a

5a

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

TE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF BERNALILLO

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
TE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.
IAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner,
-vs-

DR-81-1660

tfY ANDREW JOJOLA,
Respondent.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner,
-vsJIMMY ANDREW JOJOLA,
Respondent

omes now petitioner through Assistant Attorney General
ell Ray and moves the Court for its order of dismissal
Lout prejudice for the reason that the paternity issue will
pursued in the Tribal Court of Isleta Pueblo as requested
espondent.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Carrell Ray
Assistant Attorney General
909 Virginia NE, Suite 101
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108
(505) 841-4582

TDR-SI-I66CT

ORDER

MOTION TO DISMISS

rtify that I mailed a copy of
foregoing instrument to
osing counsel of record this
lay of June, 1983
CR

COUNTY OF BERNALILLO

This matter having come before the Court on petitioner's
motion to dismiss, petitioner appearing in person by and
through Assistant Attorney General William Walker and Barbara
A. Brown, respondent appearing by and through his attorney,
Anthony F. Little and the Court being advised in the premises,
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that the
above cause is dismissed pursuant to petitioner's motion, without prejudice.
s/ Judge A. Joseph Alarid
DISTRICT JUDGE
Approved by:
Assistant Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General
Anthony F. Little
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APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

TE OF NEW MEXICO

COUNTY OF BERNALILLO

STATE OF NEW MEXICO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
LTE OF NEW MEXICO, ex reL
VIAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner,
-vs-

DR-81-1660

MY ANDREW JOJOLA,
Respondent.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex reL
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner,
-vs~~
JIMMY ANDREW JOJOLA,
Respondent.

tomes now petitioner through Assistant Attorney General
rell Ray and moves the Court for its order of dismissal
lout prejudice for the reason that the paternity issue will
pursued in the Tribal Court of Isleta Pueblo as requested
respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Carrell Ray
Assistant Attorney General
909 Virginia NE, Suite 101
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108
(505) 841-4582

DR-8T-T660

ORDER

MOTION TO DISMISS

rtify that I mailed a copy of
foregoing instrument to
>osing counsel of record this
day of June, 1983
CR

COUNTY OF BERNALILLO

This matter having come before the Court on petitioner's
motion to dismiss, petitioner appealing in person by and
through Assistant Attorney General William Walker and Barbara
A. Brown, respondent appearing by and through his attorney,
Anthony F. Little and the Court being advised in the premises,
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that the
above cause is dismissed pursuant to petitioner's motion, without prejudice.
s/ Judge A. Joseph Alarid
DISTRICT JUDGE
Approved by:
Assistant Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General
Anthonv F. Little
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APPENDIX E

which costs shall be recovered from support paid. If the costs
exceed the amount of one month's support obligation, then
the monthly collection shall be limited to ten percent of the
collection. Where the service rendered is solely for the collection of past-due support, the department shall levy a fee not in
excess of that provided by the federal act, against the delinquent parent[9] which fee shall be in addition to the amount
of the delinquency and collectible as other judgments.

Mexico Statutes Annotated,
ic Assistance Act
-27. Single State agency; powers and duties,
he human services department is designated as the single
agency for the enforcement of child and spousal support
nations pursuant to Title IV D of the federal act with the
wing duties and powers:
establish the paternity of a child in the case of the child
i out of wedlock with respect to whom an assignment of
sort rights has been executed in favor of the department;
establish an order of support for children receiving aid
'amilies with dependent children and, at the option of the
artment, for the spouse or former spouse with whom such
dren are living but only if a support obligation has been
iblished with respect to such spouse or former spouse, for
Dm no order of support presently exists and seek modifica1, based upon the noncustodial parent's ability to pay, of
=+ing orders in which the support order is inadequate to
jrly care for the child and the spouse or former spouse
h whom the child is living;
2. enforce as the real party in interest any existing order
the support of children who are receiving aid to families
h dependent children or of the spouse or former spouse with
om such children are living; and
D. represent nonaid families with dependent children in
\ establishment and enforcement of paternity and child
)port obligations, including locating the absent parent, for
ich it shall charge the applicant a start-up fee of twenty

27-2-28. Liability for repayment of public assistance.
A. A noncustodial parent is liable to the department in the
amount of the public assistance lawfully and properly furnished
to the children, and the spouse or former spouse with whom
such children are living, to whom the noncustodial parent owes
a duty of support; except that if a support order has been
entered, liability for the time period covered by the support
order shall not exceed the amount of support provided for in
the order, and provided that no claim not based upon a prior
judgment can be made by the department for reimbursement
for any period more than six years prior to the date of filing of
any action seeking payment.
B. Amounts of support due and owing for periods prior
to the granting of public assistance shall be paid to and retained
by the department to the extent that the amount of assistance
granted exceeds the amount of the monthly support obligation.
C. Amounts of support collected which are in excess of the
amounts specified in Subsections A and B of this section will be
paid by the department to the custodian of the child.
D. No agreement between any custodian of a child and a
parent of that child, either reUeving the parent of any duty of
child or spousal support or responsibility or purporting to settle
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present or future support obligations, either as a settleor prepayment, shall act to reduce or terminate any rights
e department to recover from that parent for support prol, unless the department has consented to the agreement in
ng.
The noncustodial parent shall be given credit for any
ort actually provided, including housing, clothing, foodjtt
paid prior to the entry of any order for support. The non>dial parent has the burden on the issue of any payment.

